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Tax reform would qualify as a worthy conference topic at any time,
but emerged as a particularly important subject in 1985. A Republican
President in his 1984 State of the Union message directed the Secretary
of the Treasury "to simplify the entire tax code" so that all taxpayers
would be "treated more fairly." During the next 10 months the staff of the
Treasury’s Office of Tax Policy labored to fulfill that mandate, and in
November the Secretary presented the President with the Treasury re-
port, entitled Tax Reform for Fairness, Simplicity, and Economic Growth
(hereafter Treasury I).
The main thrust of the Treasury plan was a substantial broadening
of the income tax base combined with reductions in the marginal rates.
Hence, a conservative Administration, fundamentally antagonistic to
taxation and government spending, had embraced an approach es-
poused over several decades by liberals, who generally liked the income
tax and supported government programs. With the emergence of this
coalition, the time seemed ripe for meaningful tax reform.
The Treasury I proposals received wide endorsement from tax ex-
perts, but loud outcries were immediately heard from other quarters. In
response, the Treasury staff went back to work and after six more
months obtained the President’s approval for a somewhat diluted report
entitled The President’s Tax Proposals to the Congress for Fairness, Growth, and
Simplicity (hereafter Treasury II).
To garner support for Treasury II, the President made a television
appeal to Americans to support the transformation of an "un-American"
income tax system into one that is "clear, simple and fair for all." In an
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expression of bipartisan enthusiasm, the Democratic chairman of the
House Ways and Means Committee responded immediately after the
President’s address and endorsed the tax principles embodied in the
Administration’s proposals.
In the months following the release of Treasury II and the initial
euphoria, support for broad-based tax reform deteriorated. As the time
approached to enact legislation, concern emerged on many fronts over
the potential adverse economic consequences of including previously
untaxed items in the tax base. Some cited the potential deleterious ef-
fects on individual saving and labor force activity, some the disruptive
effects on financial markets, and some the adverse impact on invest-
ment. Others were concerned about the implications for institutions de-
pendent on charitable contributions and the ramifications for the
revenue-raising capabilities of state and local governments. These al-
leged adverse outcomes contributed to a further watering down of the
already soggy Treasury II proposals.
The purpose of the Boston Fed’s conference was to separate un-
founded allegations from reasonable predictions, through a systematic
and comprehensive analysis of the potential economic impact on the
various sectors of the economy of Treasury I, Treasury II, and some of
the other tax reform proposals. The hope was that clarifying the issues
would improve future debate on tax reform. Second, even if comprehen-
sive tax reform did involve some adverse consequences, the question
was posed whether reform might still be "worth it."
Three major conclusions emerged from the conference. First, most
participants viewed the need to raise more revenues as a much higher
priority than reforming the tax system. Second, the supply-side effects
from major revenue-neutral tax reform were judged, on the whole, to be
relatively small. Third, tax reform of the extent proposed in Treasury I
was judged to be definitely "worth it," but as the reform proposals be-
came increasingly watered down the participants became more
doubtful.
The Rationale for Tax Reform
In the United States, as in other developed countries, a person’s
income generally has been viewed as the best measure of ability to con-
tribute to the cost of government. Although economic theorists have
proposed many definitions of income, most have supported the Haig-
Simons concept. This defines income, as an index of taxpaying capacity,
as consumption plus an increase in net worth during a given period.
Defining income in this broad manner ensures that taxpayers with equal
economic resources are assessed equal amounts of taxes and those withTAX SIMPLIFICATION: AN OVERVIEW
different capabilities are assessed different amounts.
Over time, the definition of income in the U.S. income tax has
moved steadily away from the Haig-Simons ideal. Taxation of a given
amount of income now varies widely depending on how it is earned and
how it is used. As a result, much income escapes taxation and higher
marginal rates are required to produce any given amount of revenue.
Moreover, the tax system is highly vulnerable to variations in inflation
and needlessly complex. These characteristics combine to make a tax
system that is not only unfair but also distorts the allocation of economic
resources.
The Treasury Proposals
In the introductory paper, Charles McLure, Jr. stated that the Trea-
sury had four main objectives in its tax reform initiative. The first was
fairness, particularly with respect to the taxation of individuals with the
same total h~come. This notion of horizontal equity requires that all
income be taxed equally regardless of its source or use. With respect to
vertical equity, that is, the relative tax treatment of individuals with
different levels of economic resources, the Treasury generally accepted
the degree of progressivity currently in the system. The only exception
was an effort to eliminate taxes assessed on families below the poverty
level.
The second objective of the tax reform effort was neutrality, or mini-
mizing interference with economic decisions in relatively efficient mar-
kets. Simplification, which was the third objective, consisted of two
parts: simplification of factors that plague taxpayers as they prepare their
returns, such as forms, instructions, and record-keeping, and simplifica-
tion of loophole provisions that encourage tax planning and avoidance
and distort decisionmaking. The fourth objective, economic growth,
was initially thought to emerge naturally as the result of lower rates and
a more neutral system.
To achieve these goals, Treasury I proposed to tax all real economic
income uniformly and consistently at lower rates. Income rather than
consumption was selected as the base primarily because of pragmatic
concerns in the face of severe time and resource constraints. Moreover,
the difficulties of taxing bequests under a consumption or expenditure
tax raised the possibility that individuals might amass large untaxed
estates. The taxation of real income was judged necessary to avoid in-
equities and distortions, such as those created during the 1970s by an
income tax based on nominal income in a world of high and variable
inflation. Furthermore, all real economic income must be taxed in order
to have a fair and neutral tax system. Finally, to reduce the double tax-
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the corporate and personal income tax systems by allowing corporations
to deduct from their taxable income 50 percent of dividends paid.
Reform efforts were hampered right from the beginning, since the
President was forced to remove the elimination of the home mortgage
deduction from the list of possible options. This decision had two sig-
nificant implications: first, it precluded access to a major source of rev-
enue; and second, it .made the goal of neutral tax treatment of all
alternative investments unattainable.
Despite this limitation, Treasury I made important strides toward
the objective of taxing all real income uniformly and consistently. The
most significant changes included the taxation of a portion of health
insurance benefits; the elimination of the deduction for state and local
taxes; and limitations on the deductions for charitable giving. To make
the tax system less subject to distortions from inflation, Treasury I also
attempted to improve the measurement of income from capital by pro-
posing explicit inflation adjustment for depreciation allowances, the cost
of goods sold from inventory, capital gains, and interest income and
expense. Under Treasury I, oil and gas and other extractive industries
would also be taxed on the basis of their economic income.
The main change between Treasury I and Treasury II was a move-
ment away from neutrality through the introduction of explicit incen-
tives for growth. Indexing capital income for inflation was replaced by
an accelerated depreciation schedule and more favorable treatment of
capital gains for assets that appreciate dramatically. Treasury II also fell
short of Treasury I in defining income comprehensively, by further limit-
ing the taxation of health insurance benefits and restoring some deduc-
tions for charitable contributions. Despite this backtracking, McLure
maintained that Treasury II still represented fundamental reform
through a reduction of marginal rates, the elimination of deduction for
state and local taxes, the beginning of taxation of health care benefits,
and an increase in the personal exemption.
Discussion
The three discussants of McLure’s paper were unanimous in their
praise of his role as the chief architect of a truly fundamental tax reform
proposal. Henry Aaron supported his distinction between the two kinds
of simplification and noted that sometimes they reinforce one another
but sometimes, such as in the case of the Treasury proposal to index
interest, they are in sharp conflict. He agreed with McLure that the
immunity of mortgage interest to reform efforts was the "Achilles’ heel"
of the proposed changes in the taxation of capital income and echoed
McLure’s dismay at the reversal of the Treasury I’s proposal to repeal
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Aaron also questioned McLure’s justification for his elimination of
the deduction of state and local taxes. He acknowledged that deductibil-
ity is a blunt instrument for encouraging socially desirable spending and
that targeted grants-in-aid are superior, but he was reluctant to sacrifice
deductibility in face of the dramatic cutbacks in the grants programs.
John Shoven made two points with respect to the failure to tax
owner-occupied housing. First, he questioned whether treating all cor-
porate investments equally is necessarily desirable if residential real es-
tate escapes taxation altogether. Second, he maintained that the problem
with the treatment of housing is not the deductibility of mortgage inter-
est, but the failure to include the value of imputed rent in taxable in-
come. Disallowing mortgage interest deductions would just create a
new distortion between those who have large mortgages and those who
have large equity positions in their homes.
Shoven also questioned the Administration’s decision to maintain
the existing distribution of tax burden by income class, in that the cur-
rent distribution was in part the result of the many tax shelters and legal
abuses available to the wealthy. He concluded by accusing the Adminis-
tration of false advertising with regard to tax reduction. The only way
that 70 to 80 percent of households could be better off under a revenue-
neutral tax reform package was through the failure to attribute the taxes
paid by corporations to any individuals. Similarly, effective marginal tax
rates are not lowered very much by eliminating the deduction for state
and local taxes, since this is roughly equivalent to changing the level of
government that collects the taxes.
Emil Sunley picked up on the issue of distribution neutrality and
questioned whether the percentage reduction in the tax burden is the
best measure. He suggested that one might also want to look at the
percentage change in after-tax income which shows that the tax program
dramatically favors higher income people. On the other hand, if the
distributional impact of the increase in the corporate income tax were
included, higher income individuals and families do not fare as well.
Sunley then suggested that critics of the Treasury II proposal for
capital gains treatment may be unnecessarily pessimistic. In fact, the
incentive to convert ordinary income into capital gains would be cut by
more than half, since the differential between ordinary rates and capital
gains rates would be narrowed substantially. Finally, Sunley made a plea
for indexing depreciation and capital gains even if the indexing of debt
may prove to be complex. He acknowledged that partial indexing will
allow individuals to profit from inflation by borrowing to buy an asset,
but he maintained that the inequity resulting from partial indexing
would be superior to the ad hoc adjustments under the current system.
Much of the discussion focused on the issue of owner-occupied
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mortgage interest deduction would not necessarily be an improvement.
He argued that since nearly everyone faces liquidity constraints, most
people would not be able to buy homes without the favorable tax con-
cessions. Hence, repealing the mortgage interest deductibility would
prevent the majority of people from taking advantage of the preferential
tax treatment of owner-occupied housing and would reduce the gap
between the effective rate on housing and that on the other two-thirds of
the capital stock.
Patric Hendershott rejected the equity implications of eliminating
the mortgage interest deduction since it would mean that wealthy peo-
ple would continue to get full benefits from investing in housing while
low-income and middle-income people denied the deduction would be
squeezed out of the market. Hendershott also reiterated the assertion
that to achieve a "level playing field," in the absence of a tax on housing,
requires not taxing any other forms of investment.
Towards the end of the session, the discussion moved from housing
to the incidence of the corporate tax and the fact that this tax was not
allocated among individuals in the distributional tables prepared by the
Treasury. Joseph Pechman asserted that if the corporate tax is borne by
stockholders (as was assumed by Treasury for classifying people by in-
come class), then the tax reform proposals would appear much less
favorable to the rich. Shoven disagreed, making the point that a large
share of corporate equities are held by pension funds and the claims to
these assets are distributed much farther down the income scale.
The Effect on Individuals
Joel Slemrod’s paper shifted the discussion from alternative tax re-
form strategies to the economic effect of particular proposals--specifical-
ly, their direct effect on individuals. To do this, Slemrod assessed how
individuals would fare under Treasury II’s stated objectives of fairness,
simplicity, and economic growth.
Fairness
Slemrod explored three alternative measures of fairness--vertical
equity, horizontal equity, and what he called transitional equity. In terms
of vertical equity, Slemrod concluded that it was difficult to dispute the
Administration’s claim of approximate distributional neutrality, even
though no attempt was made to trace out the ultimate incidence of taxes
paid by corporations.
On the subject of horizontal equity, Slemrod noted that preferential
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preferred activity is available to everyone and valued equally by all. But
many of the preferential provisions in the current law do produce in-
equities, since they apply to activities not available to and not valued
equally by all people. The Treasury I proposals to limit deductions for
charitable contributions~ tax a portion of fringe benefits, and repeal the
deductibility of state and local taxes eliminate some horizontal inequities
and move the tax system towards one where taxpayers who are equally
well-off pay equal taxes.
Any tax reform creates transitional equity problems by altering re-
turns on long-term commitments made under former law, leading to
windfall gains and losses for a period of time. Treasury II addresses
these potential inequities by gradually phasing in some provisions,
which allows time for adjustment to new rules and reduces the present
value of gains and losses. In addition, the proposed excess depreciation
recapture rule under Treasury II also serves to limit windfall gains that
would otherwise accrue to previously acquired capital.
Simplicity
Slemrod then turned to the second objective of the Administration’s
tax reform initiative--namely, simplicity. He noted that Treasury II ad-
dresses the problem of complexity directly by eliminating numerous
special provisions. Similarly, reducing marginal tax rates lessens the in-
centive to reduce taxable income. On the other hand, collapsing the
number of tax brackets from 14 to 3, although characterized by the Ad-
ministration as a key element in simplification, actually has an insignifi-
cant effect on the complexity of the system. Once taxable income is
computed, finding tax liability in the tax tables is a trivial operation
which would not be simplified by having fewer brackets. Finally, several
provisions in the Treasury II proposal, such as the attempt to expand the
taxation of fringe benefits received by employees, would actually com-
plicate the filing process. On balance, Slemrod concluded that the Ad-
ministration’s proposal would not significantly reduce the complexity of
the system.
Economic Growth
Slemrod noted that the Administration’s third objective--economic
growth--took a back seat to neutrality in both Treasury I and Treasury II.
Also, in the long run, the growth rate of an economy is determined by
the rate of technological progress and growth of the labor supply and tax
policy was unlikely to have a strong influence on these factors.
In the shorter run, however, growth could be enhanced by increas-
ing the ratio of capital to labor and Treasury II contained several propos-8 Alicia H. Munnell
als aimed at stimulating saving and investment. Expansion of IRAs and
the reduction in marginal tax rates could both change the marginal after-
tax rate of return to saving. However, IRAs need not create new saving,
since an individual can gain a deduction simply by transferring pre-
viously accumulated assets or by borrowing funds and, moreover, IRAs
will never be effective at the margin for most people since they are
subject to relatively low caps. Slemrod concluded that, based on existing
estimates of interest elasticity, the reduction in marginal rates could be
expected to increase saving by less than 2 percent.
On the investment side, Slemrod argued that the tax incentives to
corporate investment would increase slightly, although this conclusion
was difficult to reconcile with the projected increase in corporate rev-
enues. Overall, Slemrod concluded that the taxation of investment is
probably not changed very much under the Administration proposals,
although the relative burden is shifted from nonresidential to residential
capital and from corporate structures and inventories to equipment.
Increased labor supply is a major factor that could contribute to
growth, but Slemrod’s back-of-the-envelope calculations indicated that
the reduction in marginal rates proposed in Treasury II would be expect-
ed to increase the supply of labor by 3 percent at most. Since true after-
tax wage rates would not rise in proportion to the decline in marginal
federal rates because of the elimination of the deductibility of state and
local taxes, the labor supply response would be even smaller than initial-
ly calculated.
Slemrod’s overall conclusion was that Treasury II, while not as radi-
cal or far-reaching as Treasury I, would represent an improvement over
the current system. It would induce more efficient use of resources, and
thus improve economic performance, increase equity and reduce tax
evasion. On the other hand, Treasury II would not reduce the complex-
ity of the tax system, would not increase incentives to save and invest,
would not increase the supply of labor significantly and would, like any
major tax reform, introduce some transitional inequities.
Discussion
Slemrod’s discussants found themselves in basic agreement with
his conclusions. Alan Blinder began by reinforcing the case presented by
Slemrod for equal tax rates on different sources of income, since he, like
Slemrod, viewed neutrality as the real thrust of Treasury I and II. He
noted that although optimal tax theory does not automatically prescribe
equal tax rates, it does say that it is always optimal to tax different factor
inputs at equal rates. Moreover, if there is equal ignorance about the loss
associated with deviating from the optimal, then equal taxation is the
best policy. Finally, once unequal tax rates are sanctioned, politics willTAX SIMPLIFICATION: AN OVERVIEW
ensure that the deviations have more to do with political pressures than
with cross-elasticities of demand.
Blinder argued, however, that fairness cannot be achieved by neu-
trality alone but also requires increasing marginal rates. He applauded
the fact that Treasury II awarded disproportionately larger reductions to
the poor, but he attributed its generosity to the rich to "an excessive
attachment to flatness."
On the simplicity issue, Blinder felt that Slemrod understated the
potential contribution of more equal tax rates on different income
sources to reducing the complexity of the current law. Equalizing tax
rates would reduce significantly the incentive to transform income from
one form to another and thereby dramatically simplify the system.
On the subject of growth, Blinder acknowledged Slemrod’s point
that some short-run growth gains could result from raising the ratio of
capital to labor, but questioned whether increasing the saving rate be-
yond that produced by market forces should be given high priority.
Blinder suggested that such a policy objective would be called for only if
the income tax seriously distorted choices away from saving, but con-
cluded that the evidence suggested such distortions were relatively
small.
Generally, Blinder agreed with Slemrod’s overall conclusion that
Treasur~y II, although not as elegant as Treasury I, would make things
better rather than worse than the current system and economists should
support it enthusiastically.
David Bradford only reluctantly came to the conclusion that Trea-
sury II would represent a clear improvement over the current system.
He was concerned about whether the windfall gains and losses arising
from such massive tax reform were really compensated for by the im-
provement in efficiency and apparent equity of the tax system. He cited
the examples of the large windfall loss that would be experienced by the
owners of timber, which would no longer be treated as an asset eligible
for long-term capital gains treatment, and the windfall gains that would
accrue to those who have large retirement savings, which will be drawn
down at lower tax rates than anticipated. Bradford also questioned the
seriousness of many alleged inequities, since he argued that so long as
taxpayers have the option of choosing each other’s portfolios, differ-
ences in their tax liabilities do not imply unfairness.
Bradford’s conclusion was that current tax reform efforts should be
aimed at replacing the current income tax with consumption-oriented
taxation using cash-flow accounting. This approach would produce
genuine simplicity as well as equity and efficiency. It would also elimi-
nate the need for indexing capital income, without which inflation will
continue to create serious distortions under the current system.
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about the equity effects of comprehensive tax reform. Alan Auerbach
questioned the ability to measure windfall gains and losses once the role
of expectations is considered. He hypothesized that, with the constant
revisions in the tax code, tax provisions represent just one more uncer-
tainty that people take into account when making their decisions. Law-
rence Summers focused on the relative reduction in burden afforded the
rich under the various tax reform proposals. If the total reduction includ-
ed not only the reduction in taxes they pay, but also the reduction in
efforts to avoid taxes, the gains to the rich would be even greater than
those presented in the official calculations.
The Effect on Capital Formation
Moving from the household to the business sector, Richard Kopcke
undertook the formidable task of measuring the potential influence on
business capital spending of Treasury I, Treasury II and two other reform
plans--Bradley-Gephardt and Kemp-Kasten. All four plans would re-
duce the corporate income tax rate, repeal the investment tax credit, and
repeal the dividend exclusion under the personal income tax. Unlike the
Treasury proposals, however, neither Bradley-Gephardt nor Kemp-Kasten
includes a deduction at the corporate level for dividends paid. The two
congressional plans differ from one another primarily in their treatment
of depreciation, capital gains and the maximum corporate income tax
rate.
Simulations under the Cash-Flow and Neoclassical Models
In analyzing the impact of these four reform proposals, Kopcke
employed two different representations of investment behavior: the
cash-flow and the neoclassical models. The cash-flow model emphasizes
liquidity constraints and uncertainties, while the neoclassical model em-
phasizes the after-tax rate of return on investment over the life of the
project. He simulated the level of investment spending o.ver the period
1981 to 2000 for each of the reform proposals and for the current acceler-
ated cost recovery system (ACRS).
To make the problem tractable, Kopcke made several standardizing
assumptions. First, although ACRS was enacted before the alternative
proposals were conceived, the simulations introduced all of the plans in
1981 to avoid giving ACRS the benefit of a head start. Since under this
scheme businessmen never benefited from the ACRS depreciation
schedules, the recapture provisions of Treasury II were not included in
the study. Second, in all simulations real GNP grew at 3 percent per
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common stock, and the relative prices of investment goods were held
constant after 1984. Corporate profits before taxes and corporate divi-
dend payments increased at the same rate as nominal GNP. Thus, none
of the simulations allowed for feedback or multiplier effects. If one tax
plan produced more investment spending than another, this additional
investment was prevented from stimulating a more rapid expansion of
economic activity by the 3 percent restraint on real GNP growth. Finally,
because of the sensitivity of the results to inflation, the simulations were
presented for three alternative rates of price increase.
The results using the cash-flow model indicate that only Treasury II
would generally increase investment compared to ACRS over the 20-
year period. Its lower corporate income tax rate, indexed depreciation
allowances, and 10 percent dividend exclusion more than compensated
investors for the loss of the investment tax credit and highly accelerated
depreciation allowances. Treasury I depressed capital formation at first,
but eventually produced rapid investment, once the gradual introduc-
tion of the substantial dividend deduction was complete. The Kemp-
Kasten proposal produced a greater rate of capital formation than
Bradley-Gephardt, but neither matched the two Treasury plans. It
should be noted that all reform proposals depressed investment in both
durable equipment and nonresidential structures relative to ACRS for
the first 10 years of the simulation period.
When the simulations were based on the neoclassical model, Trea-
sury I, Treasury II and Kemp-Kasten all outperformed ACRS in terms of
growth in the stock of producer durables and nonresidential structures.
In contrast to the cash-flow model, where the postponement of depreci-
ation allowances initially tended to reduce cash flow and investment
spending commensurately, under the neoclassical model investors re-
sponded immediately to future allowances. Consequently, in the neo-
classical simulation, Kemp-Kasten and the two Treasury plans
supported more capital formation than ACRS throughout the 20-year
period, because investors foresaw from the very beginning the value of
future depreciation allowances and dividend deductions.
Discussion
Kopcke’s three discussants all disagreed with his conclusion that
comprehensive tax reform would stimulate investment; they differed
dramatically, however, in the reasons for their disagreement and the
vehemence of their concerns.
George Hatsopoulos argued that all four tax reform proposals
would, for several years, retard capital formation and accelerate the de-
cline in the U.S. international competitive position. He based his conclu-
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taxes substantially during the next several years. The reduction in tax
rates on earnings from existing capital would be more than offset by
higher taxes on new capital. Hatsopoulos agreed that eventually three of
the four proposals may reduce business taxes and improve capital alloca-
tion efficiency, but he concluded that the present value of such benefits
was minuscule compared to the short-term damage.
His second line of attack was aimed specifically at Kopcke’s simula-
tions. First, he dismissed the cash-flow model as irrelevant to business
decisionmaking. Second, he faulted Kopcke’s calculation of the cost of
capital, a key variable in the neoclassical model. Kopcke departed from
the traditional approach of discounting by a single after-tax cost of
funds, which combines the cost of equity and the after-tax cost of debt,
and used two different discount rates in his calculation. Kopcke em-
ployed a high discount rate on real economic returns, due to their com-
paratively high degree of risk, and a much lower.discount rate for tax
benefits and interest payments, which he viewed as much more certain.
Noting that a firm cannot acquire tax benefits without simultaneously
taking on an investment, Hatsopoulos concluded that the use of sepa-
rate discount rates does not accurately reflect the alternatives and con-
straints facing business managers. In short, Hatsopoulos implied that by
using too low a user cost-of-capital figure, Kopcke failed to discount
accurately future investment gains.
Hatsopoulos then focused his remarks on the possible impact of tax-
reform-induced changes in capital formation on the ability of the United
States to compete successfully in the world economy. According to Hat-
sopoulos, inadequate incentives in the United States for saving and cap-
ital formation, not unfair trade practices, have allowed nations such as
Japan to surpass the United States in productivity growth. He suggested
that a study which applied the U.S. tax system to the Japanese economy
would predict much lower rates of capital formation for that country.
Auerbach stressed that considerable uncertainty necessarily attends
any simulated responses to major tax revisions. Although the cash-flow
and neoclassical models may have predicted investment better than any
other model, they still do not do very well; these models have signifi-
cantly underpredicted the strength of recent investment spending.
Moreover, Auerbach saw problems in Kopcke’s treatment of some
of the proposed changes in the tax code. For example, Kopcke ignored
the Treasury II windfall tax on excess depreciation, following the logic
that his comparisons began in 1981 before any excess depreciation under
ACRS would have occurred. This omission, however, made the cash
flow under Treasury II look better in the simulations than it does to
actual investors who would lose $56.5 billion by 1989 under this
provision.
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costs of transition to a more neutral tax code, namely, the waste of
substantial tax revenue on windfall gains to existing capital assets. He
encouraged tax reform proponents to consider carefully the construction
of suitable transition schemes.
Eisner also raised a number of questions concerning the neoclassical
model. Often variables such as interest rates are taken as exogenous,
the funds available, regardless of the profitability of the project. While
the cash-flow model does predict business investment fairly well, Eisner
noted that the typical positive relation between investment and cash
flow arises largely because both profits and investment are pro-cyclical.
Eisner also raised a number of questions concerning the neoclassical
model. Often variables such as interest rates are taken as exogenous,
causing serious forecasting problems if they are in fact endogenous.
Eisner illustrated this problem with the prediction by many "neoclassical
model devotees" that the introduction of ACRS in 1981 would lower the
user cost of capital and spur business investment; here, interest rates
were apparently taken as exogenous. However, capital costs rose de-
spite the more favorable tax treatment due to higher market interest
rates resulting from monetary and fiscal policy. The absence of an ex-
pected capital gains term in the neoclassical model employed by Kopcke
also troubled Eisner, for without including and specifying such a term,
the effect of corporate tax rate changes on the rental cost of capital is
ambiguous. Eisner also argued that dividend deductibility is not likely to
encourage as much new investment as Kopcke supposed, since capital
gains, not dividends, are the more significant reward to investors pro-
viding equity capital.
Eisner concluded that Treasury I would have little effect on aggre-
gate investment, although it would represent a significant step toward
neutrality in the tax treatment of different types of investment. Treasury
II, on the other hand, would probably eventually be more favorable than
ACRS to business investment, because of the combination of inflation
adjustments and more rapid depreciation than Treasury I. He ques-
tioned, however, whether these new incentives would do much for in-
vestment or simply make businesses and their owners richer.
General discussion initially focused on the worth of staying with
one tax code for a period of, say, five years, as opposed to making
frequent changes. John Makin argued that one reason that capital forma-
tion is not at a higher level is that business leaders are cognizant of the
recent tendency for the tax code to undergo frequent significant revi-
sions, and therefore discount future benefits at a much higher rate than
one might suspect. He went on to propose that a five-year moratorium
on changes, whatever the tax code, would tend to stimulate capital
formation.
Summers then pointed out that the anticipation of tax reform dis-14 Alicia H. Munnell
torts intertemporal decision-making. If one really expects, say, Treasury
II to be passed in the near future, the present becomes a very attractive
time to invest, as one can take advantage of the investment tax credit
today and of lower corporate tax rates tomorrow.
Summers also referred to the issue of international competition first
raised by Hatsopoulos. He noted that, by the national income account
identity, the trade deficit is the difference between national investment
and national savings. If, as Slemrod claimed, tax reform would not in-
crease national savings, then the effect of reform on investment closely
approximates the impact on the trade deficit. Thus, measures which
stimulate investment also worsen the trade balance.
The Effect on Financial Markets
Patric Hendershott introduced the next topic with an ambitious pa-
per in which he estimated quantitatively the effects of the four major tax
reform proposals--Treasury I, Treasury II, Bradley-Gephardt, and
Kemp-Kasten--on interest rates, asset prices, and capital stocks.
Interest Rates
Hendershott began his analysis of interest rate effects by noting that
rates are determined jointly by the supply of and demand for funds to
finance real capital investments. Changes in some tax reform provisions,
such as cuts in marginal corporate and personal tax rates or interest
indexation, lower interest rates by shifting downward both the supply
and demand curves. Other changes aimed directly at real investment,
such as eliminating investment tax credits and revising depreciation
allowances, lower the demand curve only. The precise decline in interest
rates depends on the amount by which the two curves shift and on the
size of the interest-rate elasticity of investment demand, domestic sav-
ing and net foreign saving.
Hendershott first calculated the shift in the demand curve by esti-
mating the decline in the pre-tax interest rate that would, under each
proposal, hold constant the stocks of real capital desired by individuals
and corporations. Turning to the supply side, he estimated on a disag-
gregated basis the interest rate at which savers would be willing to hold
different types of capital. Quantitatively, Hendershott determined that
the supply curve would shift down by roughly 3 percentage points un-
der Treasury I and about 11/z percentage points under the other three
proposals. For the demand curve, Hendershott estimated that the
downward shifts would be roughly 3 points again for Treasury I, 2 points
for Bradley-Gephardt, 1 point for Treasury II and no change for Kemp-TAX SIMPLIFICATION: AN OVERVIEW 15
Kasten. The larger shifts for Treasury I are attributable to its interest
indexation feature, while the smaller or zero demand shifts for Treasury
II and Kemp-Kasten are the result of more generous depreciation
allowances than under current law. Putting the shifts in the two curves
together and allowing for a dampening effect of net foreign saving, the
net decline in interest rates under each of the four proposals was 21/2
percentage points for Treasury I, 11/2 points for Bradley-Gephardt, 1
point for Treasury II and I/2 point for Kemp-Kasten.
Financial Flows
Hendershott then turned his attention to how tax reform would
affect financial flows. All four proposals would sharply restrict issues of
tax-exempt securities for nongovernmental uses, which have accounted
for roughly 60 percent of long-term tax-exempts, and all the proposals
except Treasury I would modestly reduce home mortgages. The most
dramatic change in financial flows, however, would occur under Trea-
sury I in response to the interest indexation provision. Interest rates
would decline sharply and, because home mortgage interest would still
be fully deductible, the cost of debt financing of owner-occupied hous-
ing would also fall substantially. As a result of more housing and a
higher loan-to-value ratio, home mortgage issues would increase sub-
stantially. In response to this reallocation of real capital towards houses
and to a decline in business loan-to-value ratios, the quantity of other
taxable issues would fall. This fall would be mitigated, however, by a
shift from tax-exempt financing to regular taxable financing for nongov-
ernmental purposes. Finally, the interest indexation provision in Trea-
sury I would favor financial institutions with the greatest excess of
interest income over interest expense.
Hendershott concluded with a brief look at the impact of tax reform
on capital stocks. He found that the cut in the corporate income tax.rate
would raise the after-tax cash flows from existing capital and increase
stock prices by roughly 5 percent under Kemp-Kasten and by 10 percent
under the other three reforms. Under Treasury I, the 50 percent dividend
exclusion would raise stock prices by another 15 percent.
Discussion
James Tobin questioned how one evaluates the welfare effects of the
large shifts among different types of capital, since the existing allocation
and those resulting from the four proposals represent second-best re-
gimes. Treasury I comes closest to eliminating the major sources of inef-
ficiencies, but it is also likely to hinder business investment for many
years. Similarly, both Treasury I and Treasury II improve the allocation16 Alicia H. Munnell
within the business sector but accentuate the misallocation of saving
between residential and nonresidential investment. How does one bal-
ance one effect against another in order to assess and rank the various
proposals?
Second, Tobin faulted Hendershott and the rest of the participants
for not addressing the effects of tax reform on the risks of capital accu-
mulation. By lowering tax rates, the Treasury assumes a smaller share of
the risk associated with capital investment, as well as a smaller share of
the returns from such investment. Tobin insisted that the welfare effects
of the shift in risk-bearing between investors and the general public are
as relevant as those resulting from changes in expected returns.
Third, Tobin lamented the large windfall gains and losses that arise
from the various tax reform proposals. He noted the contrast between
policymakers in 1962 who tried to stimulate investment through provi-
sions such as the investment tax credit targeted to new investment only
and the current Administration which lowers taxes on the entire existing
stock of capital. Tobin suggested trying to capture some of the windfalls
through a transitional capital gains tax.
Finally, Tobin turned to the prospects for long-run growth. Tax re-
form has the potential for affecting growth by its effect on the nation’s
long-run propensity to save. Since the current proposals for reform
would reduce the wedge between pre-tax marginal productivity of cap-
ital and the after-tax return received by savers, he believed this effect
would be positive. He concluded by expressing concern over the explo-
sive growth of public debt relative to GNP and national wealth, due to
the budget policies of the current Administration. Tobin saw this as a
grave threat to the nation’s propensity to accumulate wealth, and la-
mented the fact that this problem has taken a back seat to the push for
tax reform.
In his discussion, Barry Bosworth applauded the analysis of in-
duced changes in interest rates brought about by tax reform as an inno-
vative alternative to the traditional approach of assuming constant after-
tax rates of return and calculating the wedge between the return earned
on investments and that received by savers. Although he viewed the
two approaches as complementary, Bosworth noted that Hendershott’s
analysis brought out several points not highlighted by the wedge analy-
sis. Bosworth went on to list several issues not addressed in the paper.
First, most analyses of the tax reform plans, including Hender-
shott’s, simply ignore the sensitivity of the tax system to inflation. Trea-
sury I deserves more praise for attempting to make the system relatively
neutral with respect to inflation.
Second, the analysis paid inadequate attention to the methods by
which investment is financed. The impact of inflation on investment, for
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Without a model which incorporated endogenous changes in the finance
method, Bosworth felt one could not determine what would happen to
the tax wedge under different reform plans.
Finally, Bosworth argued that too much emphasis is usually placed
on domestic investment, and too little consideration is given to net for-
eign investment, an alternative productive use of domestic saving. From
a welfare perspective, policymakers should be interested in national sav-
ing, not domestic investment. National saving should then be allocated
between domestic and foreign investment so as to maximize returns to
Americans. While the potential impact of tax policy on saving seems
very limited based on the experience of the last five years, Bosworth
contended that it may be too early to draw conclusions, since higher
after-tax returns have different effects on older cohorts who have pre-
viously accumulated wealth and on younger ones who are just begin-
ning to save.
In the general discussion, Summers suggested that one other possi-
ble explanation for the failure of the private savings rate to respond to
increased savings incentives over the last five years would lie in the
recent institutional developments which have made it easier for people
to borrow. Since borrowing has increased, it is reasonable to suggest that
savings would have fallen even more because of easier consumer credit
but for the effect of the higher real after-tax returns.
The Effect on the Nonprofit Sector:
Educational and Charitable Organizations
In the following session, Charles Clotfelter examined the likely im-
pact of tax reform on charitable giving and thus on the educational and
other nonprofit institutions eligible to receive tax-deductible contribu-
tions. He focused primarily on individual giving since it constitutes 80
percent of the total.
Individual Giving
The most important way in which the four major tax reform propos-
als would affect charitable giving is through the sharp reduction in mar-
ginal rates, which significantly increases the after-tax cost of giving. In
addition, the proposals have some provisions aimed specifically at chari-
table contributions. Treasury ! would repeal the above-the-line charitable
deduction for nonitemizers, limit deductions to contributions in excess
of 2 percent of adjusted gross income, and limit deductions for appred-
ated assets to the lesser of inflated basis or market value. Treasury I
would affect charitable giving indirectly by reducing the number of item-18 Alicia H. Munnell
izers through the elimination of numerous existing deductions. Treasury
II would also repeal the charitable deduction for nonitemizers and re-
duce the number of taxpayers who itemize. It drops the 2 percent floor,
however, and relegates the constructive realization of appreciated gifts
to the minimum tax. Bradley-Gephardt would allow all taxpayers to
deduct contributions at the basic rate of 14 percent, while Kemp-Kasten
would retain full deduction for all taxpayers, though at significantly
lower marginal rates.
Clotfelter simulated the impact of these four proposals on charitable
giving, using both constant elasticity and variable elasticity assump-
tions. In both cases, Bradley-Gephardt showed the largest decline (23
percent) and Kemp-Kasten the smallest (13 to 15 percent). Clotfelter
then used survey data to calculate the likely impact by type of organiza-
tion. The data showed that wealthy people tend to give to educational
and cultural institutions, while middle and lower income groups favor
religious organizations. Due to the large reduction in top marginal rates,
the proposals generally produce the largest percentage declines in gifts
to higher education and to cultural institutions.
Appreciated Assets
Clotfelter then analyzed the possible effects of the Treasury I and
Treasury II proposals to eliminate or reduce the current favorable treat-
ment for gifts of appreciated assets. Under current law, some capital
gains escape taxation completely, which reduces the progressivity of the
tax code. Furthermore, taxpayers tend to overvalue donated assets,
which creates persistent difficulties for tax administrators.
Treasury I addresses the problem by allowing donors to deduct no
more than the inflation-adjusted basis of appreciated property, which is
equivalent to constructive realization of the capital gain in the Treasury I
environment where only real gains are taxed. Treasury II introduces a
similar provision into the minimum tax, where unrealized gains on such
gifts would be counted as a preference item. This feature offsets the
exclusion of capital gains on such assets for taxpayers with preference
items in excess of $10,000. Clotfelter’s simulation results indicated that
these reforms would significantly raise the price of giving appreciated
assets.
Clotfelter concluded that the impact of tax reform on charitable giv-
ing would be sizable. Reductions in long-run giving of 15 percent and
more were predicted for the four major tax reform plans and even larger
reductions would be likely for institutions that depend on gifts from
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Discussion
Eugene Steuerle made four cautionary comments. First, he reiterat-
ed Clotfelter’s conclusion that the empirical results in this field should
be interpreted with great care. Research to date explains only a little
about incentives to give; large unexplained variances in giving across
individuals still remain. Moreover, the consensus of elasticities is de-
rived primarily from the results of cross-sectional analysis; time series
data and certain survey questionnaires appear not to support the high
elasticities found in these studies.
Second, even if the numerical results were totally correct, further
analysis would be required to determine what the numbers meant in
terms of social costs and benefits.
Third, Steuerle argued that the existing literature generally failed to
establish efficiency and/or equity targets. This omission made it difficult
to evaluate specific proposals, such as floors on giving or limitations on
gifts of appreciated property. Changes in these provisions were often
accepted with little thought about what they were trying to achieve.
Finally, Steuerle offered the proposition that whereas broad-based,
low-rate tax reform may reduce charitable giving, failure to achieve ma-
jor tax reform would produce a weaker, not a stronger, charitable sector.
Without tax reform, the ongoing erosion of the income tax, in favor of
payroll and excise taxes, would be likely to continue. Since these alterna-
tive taxes contain no incentive to give, charitable contributions would be
hurt significantly.
Gerard Brannon opened the general discussion by suggesting that it
would be possible to avoid the predicted declines in charitable giving
associated with reductions in marginal rates by allowing an augmented
deduction, say $1.15, for each dollar of contribution. In fact, the favor-
able treatment of appreciated property may be an example of this type of
stimulus--albeit extremely inequitable. Brannon argued that the impor-
tant question was not the form the subsidy should take but rather just
how large a subsidy for charitable giving should be incorporated in the
tax code.
Summers tossed out the notion that perhaps the favorable treat-
ment of appreciated property was just the natural response to a tax
system that did not tax unrealized capital gains at death. If people do not
pay tax on capital gains when they leave their assets to their children,
why should they have to pay a tax on these gains when they give their
assets to charity?
Aaron raised the question of just how sensitive people are to rela-
tively small changes in incentives, and wondered if it were realistic to
assume a linear relationship between incentives and behavior. Clotfelter
agreed that responses to small changes in incentives would be negligi-
ble, but contended that the use of a linear function in the simulations20 Alicia H. Munnell
probably did not distort the results since the aggregate impact came
mainly from the large changes that affected the middle and high income
taxpayers.
Pechman suggested that a variable price elasticity of giving was
probably more realistic than a constant elasticity. He cited as evidence
the underprediction of changes in giving among lower and middle in-
come persons in response to the 1981 tax cut, presented in Clotfelter’s
paper.
The Effect on the Nonprofit Sector:
State and Local Governments
Treasury I, Treasury II and Bradley-Gephardt all include repeal of
the deduction for state and local taxes as one of the main ways to finance
rate reduction in their tax-reform package. Kemp-Kasten proposes re-
peal of the deductibility of sales and income taxes, but retains the prop-
erty tax deduction. All four of these plans also severely restrict the
possibilities for tax-exempt borrowing by state and local entities. The
merit of these proposed changes was one of the more hotly debated
issues at the conference.
Elimination of Tax Deductibility
Dick Netzer began his paper by arguing that if all taxes imposed at
the state and local level were used to buy ordinary private goods or "club
goods," then deductibility would be both horizontally inequitable and
inefficient. On the other hand, if state and local taxes were used solely
for the provision of pure public goods, then equity would require that
individual taxable income be measured net of these involuntary pay-
ments and efficiency considerations would argue for deductibility, since
these goods would be undersupplied in the absence of a subsidy. Ac-
cording to Netzer, about 10 to 20 percent of state and local tax-financed
expenditures produced interstate benefit "spillovers," although these
percentages may be somewhat greater at the margin. Netzer concluded
that the existence of some spillovers suggests the possibility of a partial
deductibility or the deductibility of selective taxes as desirable policy.
Netzer then turned to the question of the effectiveness of deductibil-
ity in encouraging aggregate state and local spending and the potential
impact of eliminating the deduction. Using a price elasticity of -0.5, a
number around which Netzer found an "uneasy" consensus, assuming
that the median voter was an itemizer, and calculating that elimination
of deductibility would raise the price by about 18 percent, Netzer con-
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percent. Since deductible taxes account for only 27 percent of total state
and local revenues, the expected decline in total state-local spending
from all sources would be roughly 2 percent. Hence, Netzer concluded
that effects on aggregate revenues do not provide a convincing case for
continued deductibility. Netzer, therefore, surmised that the case for
deductibility must rest on a national interest, if any, in the composition
of state and local taxes or in the disparities among jurisdictions that
would be created by ending deductibility.
Netzer investigated the possible shifts in the composition of rev-
enues that might occur in response to eliminating the deduction. On the
positive side, a substitution of sensibly designed user charges for cur-
rently deductible taxes would probably improve efficiency. On the other
hand, greater reliance on selective excise taxes with narrow revenue
bases would allow greater substitution of nontaxed for taxed services
and thereby create the potential for welfare losses. Similarly, greater use
of corporation income and business sales taxes would most likely impair
efficiency. A reduction in the use of the property tax would slightly
reduce the progressivity of the tax system, while a shift from a tax on
housing to one on business-owned assets would lead to some loss of
efficiency. On balance, composition considerations led Netzer to favor
narrowing, rather than eliminating, deductibility.
Netzer then turned to the effect that ending deductibility would
have on different jurisdictions. Removing the current subsidy for high-
tax states would be desirable social policy if it simply eliminated spend-
ing that produced no interstate benefits. However, Netzer found that
financial crises at the state and local level almost inevitably led to cuts in
the area of public assistance and social services. Based on this evidence,
Netzer feared that the downward pressure on expenditures in higher tax
states caused by the end of deductibility would produce a similar pattern
of spending reductions.
Netzer also argued that the end of deductibility would increase
sharply the differential in tax burdens among jurisdictions. This rise
would be likely to cause some locational shifts over time as individuals
responded to the incentive for the affluent to move to income-segregat-
ed communities. For this reason as well as the likely decrease in redis-
tributive expenditures, Netzer concluded once again that he favored
restricting, rather than eliminating, deductibility.
Elimination of Tax-Exempt Borrowing
On the issue of tax-exempt borrowing, Netzer concluded that while
a convincing case could be made for eliminating tax exemption entirely,
the Treasury I and Treasury II proposals, which eliminate the exemption
only on private purpose and advance refunding borrowing, were poorly22 Alicia H. Munnell
designed and most likely ineffectual. Netzer opposed the former be-
cause it would be impossible to determine the dividing line between
public and private purpose borrowing and because any restrictions im-
posed would be easily avoided. He noted that some private purpose
projects, such as airports, may be more closely tied to the national in-
terest than public projects such as municipal office buildings. He also
opposed the recommended limits on advance refunding bonds, calling
the proposal a pointless restriction on adept state and local debt
management.
Discussion
Edward Gramlich, in his comments on Netzer’s paper, agreed with
the author’s objectives and most of his technical analysis, but came to
quite different conclusions on both issues. He favored completely doing
away with the deductibility of state and local taxes, and while preferring
the complete elimination of the tax preferences for state and local bor-
rowing, would accept the Treasury reforms as a second best. Gramlich
emphasized the enormous revenue loss associated with the current tax
provisions--S35 billion for deductibility and $20 billion for tax-preferred
borrowing--and argued that revenues of this magnitude were sorely
needed to offset the large budget deficits.
Gramlich noted that deductibility was one of the provisions in the
tax code most favorable to the rich. The fact that many liberals argue for
retaining this deduction must mean that they see indirect benefits accru-
ing to the lower-income population. As Gramlich reviewed Netzer’s
three broad social offsets, however, he came away unpersuaded.
With regard to the aggregate level of state and local spending,
Gramlich agreed with Netzer that a small decrease would occur as a
result of eliminating deductibility. However, Gramlich noted that in low-
income places such as Detroit, where relatively few voters itemize, virtu-
ally no reductions at all would occur.
On the subject of the composition of state and local revenues,
Gramlich also found no significant social offset. He believed that Netzer
overemphasized the potential inefficiencies in any new user charges im-
posed by states and localities and the likelihood in a highly competitive
world that nuisance taxes would be imposed on businesses.
Finally, as far as the effect on interjurisdictional tax disparities,
Gramlich agreed with Netzer’s contention that tax prices are probably
higher for rich people who live in poor areas and these prices would rise
if deductibility were eliminated, creating an incentive for them to move.
Gramlich contended that the incentive was relatively small, however,
since the real quantity of public goods consumed is higher in the rich
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Unlike Netzer, Gramlich found merit in the Treasury’s proposed
limitation on tax-exempt borrowing. He acknowledged the difficulties in
defining which issues should be classified as private-purpose bonds, but
contended that a partial restriction on borrowing preferences, although
difficult to enforce, would be better than doing nothing.
The general discussion began with Auerbach reiterating Netzer’s
concern that if deductibility were eliminated, many state and local taxes
would be simply reclassified as business taxes so as to maintain deduct-
ibility. Bradford picked up on this point and advocated that the elimina-
tion of deductibility should extend to business taxes as well.
The heart of the discussion, however, was focused on the merits of
deductibility. Aaron argued that the externalities produced by a govern-
ment service will likely have an impact beyond arbitrary divisions such
as city or state borders. Summers added that state and local services
need to be subsidized, since no theory suggests that voting will neces-
sarily produce the optimum amount. He cited the example of education,
where children are the most direct beneficiaries, yet they do not vote.
Moreover, it is unlikely that the preferences of the children are fully
reflected in the voting of their parents, since so many couples are di-
vorced with spouses living in separate jurisdictions.
Gramlich agreed that state and local spending had substantial exter-
nalities and deserved to be subsidized, but argued that deductibility
favored primarily high-income communities and was an inefficient tool
for encouraging desirable public spending. Instead, Gramlich advocated
the use of targeted grants to support these services. Others agreed that
grants-in-aid would be a more efficient approach, but were concerned
about eliminating even a crude tool such as deductibility in an era when
grants programs were being slashed. The practicality of improving the
g~’ants programs turned out to be the main area of difference between
those who supported and those who opposed the elimination of
deductibility.
Richard Musgrave concluded the discussion by suggesting that de-
ductibility might have some merit in its own right as a tool for encourag-
ing state and local spending. He noted that consideration is generally
given to state and local effort, as well as need, when deciding the level of
federal assistance and grants; in a similar fashion, tax deductibility may
be a desirable form of federal assistance based on the fiscal effort of
states and localities.
An Overall Assessment of the Tax Reform Effort
This session brought together Richard Musgrave, Joseph Pechman
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respectively as "The Silver Fox of Public Finance, The Canny Old Hand
of Taxation, and The Young Flash," to evaluate the current tax reform
efforts.
Key Features of Reform
Musgrave began by commenting on the key features of this tax
reform effort. First, the focus has been on the income tax, which he
found not surprising since this levy has been the mainstay of the federal
tax system ever since World War II. Musgrave noted that the expenditure
tax approach, to which economists have devoted so much time in recent
years, had little influence on the proposals.
Second, with regard to the pattern of tax reform, Musgrave noted
that the key element has been to broaden the tax base and raise the same
level of revenue with lower rates. Musgrave was pleased that, despite
the questions raised by optimal tax theory, broad-based taxation remains
a desirable goal. The other main feature of the pattern of reform has
been to eliminate horizontal inequities in the context of retaining the
existing vertical distribution. While Musgrave acknowledged that this
approach permits progress toward agreement, he suggested that it does
not make much sense to accept as a standard the vertical pattern of tax
liabilities that has resulted from massive horizontal inequities. A final
element to the pattern of the tax reform has been revenue neutrality,
which has separated the reform problem from the need to increase rev-
enues. Musgrave found the need for additional revenues as primary at
this time and wondered whether tax reform was not being used by some
as a purposeful diversion.
The Individual Income Tax
Musgrave then turned his attention to the specifics of the reform
proposals. According to 1985 tax expenditure data, exclusions from the
tax base amount to 78 percent of total revenues. As ambitious as it was,
the base broadening under Treasury I totaled only 13 percent of actual
revenues. The reason that Treasury I fell so far short of full revenue
potential was that it left entirely or largely untouched the mortgage
interest deduction, pension contributions under employer plans, social
security benefits, and employer contributions to health insurance. De-
spite the limited gains in expanding the base, Musgrave acknowledged
that Treasury I made some strides in reducing horizontal inequity.
Similarly, in discussing capital gains, Musgrave characterized Trea-
sury I as being very bold in its attempt to tax realized capital gains in full,
but noted that the proposal failed to even discuss the problem of unrea-
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asset when it is transferred at death. Musgrave lamented that none of
the tax reform proposals even mentioned gift and estate taxes, which he
felt should take on greater importance in a situation where the top mar-
ginal rates of the income tax are being reduced substantially.
On relieving the tax burden on the poor, Musgrave contended that
the Treasury proposals do not signal a drastic change in the appropriate
treatment of low-income people. Rather, the increase in the exemption
and zero bracket amounts merely returns the situation to what it was in
1979.
With regard to marginal rates, Musgrave reiterated the point made
earlier that the reduction from 14 to 3 brackets did little to simplify the
tax code. He thought that the reduction did have substantial strategic
value, however, since it insured that the top bracket, which extends
fairly well down the income scale, cannot be too high. On balance,
Musgrave found little in the way of simplification in any of the major tax
reform proposals. He asserted that the only way to achieve real simplifi-
cation is through a flat rate consumption tax, but felt that this was too
high a price to pay.
The Corporate Income Tax
Turning to the corporate income tax, Musgrave stated that the revi-
sion of the depreciation rules might be the major accomplishment of this
tax reform effort. He also contended that accelerated depreciation in
Treasury II is probably a better mechanism for encouraging investment
than the investment tax credit, which would be repealed under all four
major reform proposals. He acknowledged that the investment tax credit
has the advantage of applying only to new investment and of being very
visible, but felt this approach suffered in its favoring of short-term over
longer-term investment projects.
Musgrave praised the Treasury I proposal for including a 50 percent
dividends paid credit, which moves the tax system toward the tradition-
al goal of integrating the corporate and individual income taxes. At the
same time, he voiced the concern that this proposal might have a detri-
mental effect on the saving rate by reducing the pressure for retention of
earnings as a means for avoiding shareholder taxation.
Summing up, Musgrave concluded that the main gains of a tax
reform along the lines of Treasury I are the improvements in horizontal
equity, which encourage people to feel better about the tax system and
perhaps even about the public sector. With regard to the supply effects,
he concluded that they would probably be small--an increase of less
than 2 percent in the household saving rate, little change in labor force
participation and perhaps a 3 percent increase in the supply of durable
equipment by the end of the decade. The main problem, however, is26 Alicia H. Munnell
that the tax reform debates divert attention from the much more impor-
tant problem of increasing revenue.
Discussion
Pechman, as the first discussant of Musgrave’s paper, arrived at
only a slightly more positive assessment of the current tax reform efforts.
He admitted the original principles of reform will have been seriously
compromised by the time legislatior~ emerges from Congress, but he
nevertheless concluded that the most likely changes would be positive.
He particularly supported the increase in the personal exemption and
standard deduction to restore tax-free status to persons below the pover-
ty line. He endorsed the redistribution of approximately $25 billion of
taxes from individuals to corporations. He also approved of lowering
rates from 50 percent to 35 percent with the revenue recovered from
eliminating loopholes, but, like Musgrave, found little virtue in the re-
duction of the number of tax brackets from 14 to 3. Finally, he praised
the efforts to improve the equity of the system through limitations on
tax-exempt borrowing, pruning personal deductions, repeal of energy
tax credits and the like.
On the other hand, Pechman pointed out the major areas where
political considerations have already eroded some of the significant im-
provements originally proposed by the Treasury. For example, pressure
from the financial community has resulted in severe retrenchment from
the original Treasury I proposal to tax real capital gains at ordinary in-
come tax rates. Another area of retreat from true broad-based taxation
was the treatment of depreciable assets. Finally, Pechman criticized the
backtracking on personal deductions, such as state and local taxes and
charitable contributions.
On balance, Pechman concluded that although serious reform has
been badly compromised, the public discussion has been educational
and will help some future President and Congress to enact real change.
If pressed, he would support, although somewhat reluctantly, the legis-
lation emerging in Congress.
In contrast, Summers concluded that the current tax reform efforts
were undesirable. Citing the excessive number of tax bills during the last
eight years, Summers made a plea for a 36-month period during which
the tax code would be left untouched. He further argued that proposed
changes do not represent significant improvement over the current
code. Repealing state and local tax deductibility was, in his opinion,
undesirable in view of the growing demand for improved public educa-
tion, the erosion of the nation’s infrastructure and marked declines in
real AFDC benefits. Summers saw little advantage in cutting rates and
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unchanged by these offsetting adjustments.
Summers viewed proposed reforms in the area of depreciation as
particularly pernicious. The Treasury proposal, argued Summers, re-
duces the burden on old capital by lowering the corporate tax rate and
providing dividend relief and raises the burden on new capital through
the elimination of the investment tax credit and lengthening depreci-
ation schedules. He saw this as both unfair and anti-growth. He also
challenged the claim that the Treasury proposal is a step toward more
neutral treatment of capital, since it was based on the misconception
that current law treats capital-intensive industry preferentially. Sum-
mers also found it difficult to believe that this proposal improves neu-
trality when it does little to change the nearly tax-free status of owner-
occupied housing, while increasing the effective taxation of business
investment.
Summers challenged the notion that the tax system unfairly confers
benefits on certain industries and individuals through preferences. As
long as people get the tax benefits they originally expected to receive
when they purchased an asset whose price and return reflect those tax
benefits, then they are not systematically beating the system or receiving
unfair rewards; only unexpected changes in the tax treatment of assets
create inequities.
Summers summarized his position by calling for another round of
TEFRA-like legislation where substantial revenues are raised by closing
a laundry list of loopholes. These additional revenues should then be
used as part of a sincere effort to attack the budget deficits.
Towards the end of the session, Carl Shoup expressed the view
which seemed to be shared by many participants that while Treasury I
would have been "worth it," the watered down Treasury II proposals and
the even more diluted congressional options would not.
Musgrave then added a few final remarks. He countered Summers’
benign neglect argument by suggesting that the present may still have
been the right time for tax reform as it brought opponents and advocates
of the income tax together. Musgrave disagreed with the suggestion
voiced frequently throughout the conference that free choice renders
horizontal inequity meaningless, claiming that because individual pref-
erences differ, preferential tax treatment may still be inequitable, even in
the presence of identical economic capacity. He concluded by proposing
that economists concern themselves solely with first-best solutions, and
leave the choice between second, third, and fourth-best solutions to
politicians.28 Alicia H. Munnell
Conclusion
Subsequent events have shown that, despite its initial promise,
1985 was not to be the year for major tax reform. Its demise can probably
be attributed to the fact that the uneasy coalition for reform consisted of
parties with very different motives. Nevertheless, comprehensive re-
structuring of the nation’s tax system reached a level of debate never
before realized and the authors of the Treasury proposals deserve enor-
mous credit for this achievement.
The conference clarified numerous issues surrounding the tax re-
form effort. First, none of the proposals would really simplify the tax
system significantly. Particularly, the reduction in the number of tax
brackets would have no impact on simplification. Second, economists
can say little about neutrality since the existing allocation of resources
and those resulting from the alternative tax proposals are all second-best
regimes. It is particularly difficult to assess proposals that improve the
allocation of resources within the business sector but accentuate the
misallocation between residential and nonresidential investment.
Third, economists have limited tools for assessing vertical equity.
The basic problem is the lack of a clear standard, so that judgments are
necessarily subjective. On the practical side, the uncertainty about the
incidence of the corporate income tax makes it impossible to measure
the distributional burden of a reform that shifts from personal taxes to
corporate taxes. Nevertheless, everyone agreed that relieving the tax
burden on low-income individuals and families was a particularly attrac-
tive feature of all the proposals.
Fourth, no revenue-neutral tax change will affect economic growth
significantly. All four proposals would probably hurt investment initial-
ly, but if the tax code were left untouched the level of capital 20 years
hence would probably be somewhat greater. None of the proposals
would have much of an impact on saving or labor supply decisions.
The main vice of all the proposals is that they entail substantial
transitional costs through the creation of large windfall gains and losses.
Transitional capital gains taxes can reduce some of the inequities but
only at the cost of greater complexity. Moreover, frequent revisions of
the tax code create enormous uncertainty that probably inhibits invest-
ment and growth.
The main virtue of all the plans would be improvement in the actual
and perceived fairness of the system. The closing of obvious tax shelters
and the broadening of the base through the elimination of deductions
would improve horizontal equity. This is not an inconsequential
achievement, since it would reduce evasion, enhance respect for the
public sector, and probably make it easier to raise additional income tax
revenues in the future to finance federal deficits.